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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff-Petitioner, : Case No. 
v. : 
DAVID E. BROWN, : Category No. 2 
Defendant-Respondent. : 
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI 
QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Whether the Utah Court of Appeals rendered a decision 
in conflict with this Court's ruling in State v. Cintron, 680 
P.2d 33 (Utah 1984) where this Court held that Theft is a crime 
of dishonesty under Rule 609(a)(2), Utah Rules of Evidence? 
OPINION BELOW 
State v. David E. Brown, No. 870504-CA (April 4, 1989 
Utah Ct. of App.) (See Addendum "A"; Opinion). 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This petition is from an opinion of the Utah Court of 
Appeals filed April 4, 1989 affirming defendant's conviction of 
Theft, a third degree felony, after a jury trial in the Third 
Judicial District Court. This Court has jurisdiction to consider 
this petition under Utah Code Ann. S 78-2-2(3)(a) (Supp. 1988). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 609(a)t 
(a) For the purpose of attacking the 
credibility of a witness, evidence that he 
has been convicted of a crime shall be 
admitted if elicited from him or established 
by public record during cross-examination but 
only if the crime (1) was punishable by death 
or imprisonment in excess of one year under 
the law under which he was convicted, and the 
court determines that the probative value of 
admitting this evidence outweighs its 
prejudicial effect to the defendant, or (2) 
involved dishonesty or false statement, 
regardless of the punishment. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant-Respondent, David E. Brown, was charged with 
Theft, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
S 76-6-404 (1978). He was found guilty after a jury trial held 
on September 16, 1987, in the Third Judicial District Court, in 
and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable Pat B. 
Brian, Judge, presiding. The court sentenced defendant to serve 
a term of zero to five years in the Utah State Prison and fined 
defendant $5,000. The court suspended the fine and prison term 
and placed defendant on probation for eighteen months. The Utah 
Court of Appeals affirmed defendant's conviction in an opinion 
filed April 4, 1989. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On July 28, 1987, defendant placed a case of cigarettes 
in a shopping basket at a Farmer Jack's grocery store (R. 155, p. 
55-57). He casually pushed the basket up and down the aisles 
until he eventually abandoned the basket and cigarettes and 
walked out of the store (R. 155, p. 57-58). Once outside, 
defendant mounted his ten-speed bike and began riding around the 
store parking lot while gazing through the store window (R. 155, 
p. 58). The store manager, Dale Olson, observed defendant's odd 
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activities and informed Gary Young, the store's security officer, 
of defendant's suspicious behavior (R. 155, p. 58). 
Defendant re-entered the store, grabbed the case of 
cigarettes, and began to walk out of the store (R. 155, p. 59). 
Mr. Young stopped defendant as he stepped out of the store (R. 
155, p. 70). The case held 30 cartons of cigarettes valued at 
$323 (R. 155, p. 60). Shortly thereafter, Officer Jo Ellen 
Waymant of the Salt Lake Police Department arrived at the store 
and arrested defendant (R. 155, p. 86). 
Prior to trial, defendant filed a motion in limine to 
exclude his prior misdemeanor theft convictions (R. 16-17). The 
trial court ruled that defendant's prior convictions were 
admissible for the limited purpose of impeaching defendant (R. 
155, p 15). As a result, defendant chose not to testify at trial 
(R. 155, p. 15).1 
On appeal, the Utah Court of Appeals held that the 
trial court erred in ruling that the prior theft convictions were 
admissible under Rule 609(a)(2). State v. Brown, No. 870504-CA, 
slip op. at 3 (April 4, 1989, Utah Ct. of App.) (Addendum "A"; 
Opinion.) The court ruled that the offense of "theft is not 
necessarily a crime involving dishonesty or false statement." 
Id. However, the court found that "the evidence was overwhelming 
as to Brown's intent to steal the cigarettes" and they were not 
convinced that a reasonable likelihood existed that Brown's 
Because defendant's conviction occurred prior to this Court's 
decision in State v. Gentry, 747 P.2d 1032 (Utah 1987), defendant 
was not required to testify in order to preserve the impeachment 
issue for appellate review. 
testimony would have produced an acquittal. I_d. at 4. Thus, the 
trial court's error in denying the motion in limine was found to 
be harmless. Id. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
This Court should grant certiorari to review the Court 
of Appeals ruling which ignores and contradicts a prior ruling by 
this Court. Specifically, the Court of Appeals determined that 
the offense of Theft is not necessarily a crime involving 
•'dishonesty" within the meaning of Rule 609(a)(2), Utah Rules of 
Evidence. The ruling contradicts this Court's opinion in State 
v. Cintron, 680 P.2d 33, 34 (Utah 1984) where this Court held 
under the previous Rules of Evidence that the offense of Theft 
"obviously involves 'dishonesty.'" Accordingly, this Court 
should grant review to dispel the confused state of law. 
ARGUMENT 
THE COURT OF APPEALS DECIDED A QUESTION OF 
LAW IN CONFLICT WITH AN OPINION OF THIS 
COURT. 
Rule 43 of the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court 
indicates that a Petition for Writ of certiorari may be sought 
when "a panel of the Court of Appeals has decided a question of 
state or federal law in a way that is in conflict with a decision 
of this court." In the present case, the Utah Court of Appeals 
wholly ignored a legal precedent of this Court. 
In State v. Brown, No. 870504-CA (April 4, 1989, Utah 
Ct. App.), the Utah Court of Appeals found that the offense of 
"theft is not necessarily a crime involving dishonesty or false 
statement." :id. at 3 (emphasis added) (Addendum "A"; Opinion.) 
-4-
Accordingly, the court held that defendant's prior misdemeanor 
theft convictions were not admissible for impeachment purposes 
under Rule 609(a) (2) , Utah Rules of Evidence. Id. Following its 
reasoning in State v. Wight, 765 P.2d 12, 17-18 (Utah App. 1988), 
the court required that an inquiry be made into the particular 
facts of the prior theft conviction to determine whether 
dishonesty or false statement were involved in the commission of 
the crime. Brown at 2. 
The decision of the Court of Appeals ignores and 
contradicts this Court's opinion in State v. Cintron, 680 P.2d 33 
(Utah 1984) where this Court unequivocally ruled that theft 
"obviously involves 'dishonesty'" for purposes of impeachment 
evidence. Jkl. at 34; (Addendum "B"; Opinion). Admittedly, 
Cintron was based upon former Rule 21 of the Utah Rules of 
Evidence, but was decided after the adoption of the new Rules of 
Evidence in 1983. Cintron, 680 P.2d at 34. However, this 
Court's legal definition of the word "dishonesty" as including 
the offense of Theft has not been abandoned and was cited as 
controlling both to the trial court and to the Court of Appeals. 
Regardless of this fact, the Court of Appeals failed to 
distinguish or even cite the Cintron case in its opinion. The 
clear inference is that the Court of Appeals made a conscious and 
silent departure from this Court's legal precedent. Without 
legal analysis, the Court of Appeals effectively rejected 
Cintron. In light of the confused state of law created by the 
Court of Appeals decision, this Court should grant this Petition 
for Writ of Certiorari and re-affirm the ruling in Cintron, 
Other jurisdictions have similarly interpreted Rule 
609(a)(2) to include theft offense as crimes involving dishonesty 
for impeachment purposes. United States v. Halbert, 668 F.2d 
489, 495 (10th Cir. 1982), cert, denied, 456 U.S. 934 (1982); 
United States v. Grandmont, 680 F.2d 867, 871 n.3 (1st Cir. 
1982); United States v. Carden, 529 F.2d 443, 446 (5th Cir. 
1976), cert, denied, 429 U.S. 848 (1976); United States v. 
Bianco, 419 F.Supp. 507 (E.D.Pa. 1976), aff'd, 547 F.2d 1164 (3rd 
Cir. 1977); State v. Brown, 111 Wash.2d 124, 761 P.2d 588 (1988), 
rehearing granted, (Wash. 1/27/89); State v. Ruan, 419 N.W.2d 
734, 738 (Iowa App. 1987); Alexander v. State, 611 P.2d 469, 476 
(Alaska 1980); People v. Holman, 43 111.App.3d 56, 356 N.E.2d 
1115, 1118 (1976); State v. Day, 91 N.M. 570, 577 P.2d 878, 884 
(N.M. App. 1978); Commonwealth v. Campbell, 244 Pa.Super. 505, 
368 A.2d 1299, 1301 (1976); James v. State, 274 Ark. 162, 622 
S.W.2d 699 (1981); State v. Grover, 518 A.2d 1039, 1041 (Me. 
1986); State v. Tolliver, 33 Ohio App.3d 110, 514 N.E.2d 922 
(1986); State v. Stanifer, 382 N.W.2d 213, 218 (Minn.App. 1986); 
State v. Gillies, 135 Ariz. 500, 662 P.2d 1007, 1014 (1983); 
State v. Holtcamp, 614 S.W.2d 389 (Tenn.Cr.App. 1980); but see 
United States v. Newman, 849 F.2d 156 (5th Cir. 1988); United 
States v. Seamster, 568 F.2d 188 (10th Cir. 1978); State v. 
Darveaux, 318 N.W.2d 44, 48 (Minn. 1982). 
It should be further noted that this Court has three 
cases presently under advisement which contain the same issue 
decided by the Court of Appeals. State v. Bruce, No. 860325; 
State v. Johnson, No. 870096; State v. Lanier, No. 880101. To 
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avoid the possibility of seesaw jurisprudence, this Court should 
grant review of the issue. Otherwise, trial judges will be faced 
with the difficulty of reconciling this Court's per curiam 
Cintron decision with the conflicting Court of Appeals Brown 
decision. 
Additionally, this Court should grant review on the 
basis that there is an apparent split between the Court of 
Appeals judges on this issue. In State v. Morehouse, 748 P.2d 
217, 220 (Utah App. 1988), cert, denied, 765 P.2d 1278 (Utah 
1988), Judge Davidson, with Judge Bench concurring, declined to 
reach the issue whether defendant was prejudiced by the trial 
judge's ruling that Burglary and Theft were automatically 
admissible under Rule 609(a)(2) as crimes of dishonesty. In 
contrast, Judge Jackson penned a strong dissent concluding that 
the trial judge committed reversible error in admitting the prior 
convictions, ^d. at 222. He resolved that ordinary theft crimes 
are not crimes of dishonesty within the meaning of Rule 
609(a)(2). Id. 
In State v. Wight, 765 P.2d 12, 17-18 (Utah App. 1988), 
Judge Greenwood, with Judge Billings concurring, found that Theft 
crimes are not necessarily crimes of dishonesty without an 
affirmative showing of fraud or deceit in the commission of the 
crime. IcL Judge Garff, concurring in a separate opinion, 
disagreed with the majority opinion. .Id. at 20. Following the 
reasoning in Cintron, he determined that theft offenses are 
fundamentally dishonest and should be automatically admitted for 
impeachment purposes under Rule 609(a)(2) as a crime with 
veracity-related elements. Id. at 22. 
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Lastly, Judge Bench did not concur in the opinion in 
the present case, but merely concurred in the result of affirming 
the conviction. Brown, slip op. at 5. Thus, it appears that the 
Court of Appeals legal conclusion on the issue is dependent on 
the relative composition of the panel of judges. 
Finally, this Court should grant review to establish 
separate State analysis of State evidentiary rules independent of 
federal interpretation of the federal counterpart. If the 
petition is granted, separate State analysis will be provided in 
the State's brief. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing reasoning, petitioner 
respectfully requests this Court to grant the Petition for Writ 
of Certiorari. / 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this ^/^ciay of April, 1989. 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
Attorney General 
DAN R. LARSEN 
Assistant Attorney General 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that four true and accurate copies of 
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ADDENDUM A 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
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ApF //!999 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
David E. Brown, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
OPINION 
(For Publication) 
Case No. 870504-CA 
Third District, Salt Lake County 
The Honorable Pat B. Brian 
Attorneys: R. Paul Van Dam, Dan R. Larsen, 
Salt Lake City, for Respondent 
Frances M. Palacios, Joan C. Watt, 
Richard G. Uday, Salt Lake City, for Appellant 
Before Judges Bench, Billings and Greenwood. 
GREENWOOD, Judge: 
David E. Brown appeals from his conviction of theft, a 
third degree felony in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 
(1978). We affirm. 
On July 28, 1987, the store manager at a Farmer Jack's 
grocery store saw Brown place a case containing thirty cartons 
of cigarettes in a shopping cart. Brown pushed the cart up and 
down the aisles then abandoned it and went out of the store. 
He rode a ten-speed bicycle across the parking lot twice, while 
looking through the store window. The store manager then 
informed the store's security officer of Brown's activities and 
they both continued to watch him. Brown reentered the store, 
picked up the case of cigarettes and began to walk out of the 
store. The security officer stopped Brown and police 
subsequently arrested and charged him with theft* 
Prior to trial, Brown filed a motion in limine to exclude 
his prior misdemeanor theft convictions. The court ruled that 
the prior convictions were admissible for the limited purpose 
of impeaching Brown's credibility. However, at trial, Brown 
did not testify and the convictions were not revealed. The 
jury returned a guilty verdict. Brown filed a motion for a new 
trial, asserting that during voir dire one juror failed to 
reveal that he had had previous retail sales employment and 
that one juror made a statement during a court recess which 
indicated juror bias against Brown. 
Brown claims on appeal that the trial court erred in 
denying his motion to exclude evidence of his prior misdemeanor 
theft convictions under Utah R. Evid. 609. We will not reverse 
the trial court's rulings on evidentiary matters unless it is 
"manifest that the trial court so abused its discretion that 
there is a likelihood that injustice resulted." State v. 
Gentry, 747 P.2d 1032, 1035 (Utah 1987). Utah R. Evid. 609(a) 
states, 
For the purpose of attacking the 
credibility of a witness, evidence that he 
has been convicted of a crime shall be 
admitted if elicited from him or 
established by public record during 
cross-examination but only if the crime 
(1) was punishable by death or 
imprisonment in excess of one year under 
the law under which he was convicted, and 
the court determines that the probative 
value of admitting this evidence outweighs 
its prejudicial effect to the defendant, 
or (2) involved dishonesty or false 
statement, regardless of the punishment. 
(Emphasis added.) 
In State v. Wight. 765 P.2d 12, 17-18 (Utah Ct. App. 1988), 
this court found that all crimes do not necessarily involve 
dishonesty or false statement under 609(a)(2). In Wight, the 
defendant had a prior conviction for aggravated robbery. This 
court found that "the crime of robbery is not necessarily one 
of dishonesty or false statement" and, therefore, that evidence 
of a prior robbery conviction is not automatically admissible 
under 609(a)(2). Ifl. at 18. We concluded that in order to 
determine whether a criminal conviction is admissible under 
609(a)(2), courts may inquire about the particular facts 
involved to determine if dishonesty or false statement was 
involved in the commission of the crime. Id. If dishonesty or 
false statement was involved, evidence of the prior conviction 
is admissible under 609(a)(2). id. Where no inquiry is made 
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about the underlying facts, and the appellate court cannot 
determine from the record if the prior crime involved 
dishonesty or false statement, the prior conviction is 
inadmissible under 609(a)(2). I&.1 
In this case, as in Wight, the court did not inquire as to 
the facts of the prior misdemeanor theft convictions, the State 
did not provide background information, and we cannot determine 
if those convictions involved dishonesty or false statement for 
purposes of 609(a)(2). In addition, for the same reasons as 
those espoused in Wight, we find that theft is not necessarily 
a crime involving dishonesty or false statement. Id. 
Therefore, we hold that the trial court abused its discretion 
in ruling that the prior theft convictions were admissible 
under 609(a)(2). 
Although the trial court erred in admitting Brown's prior 
convictions, that error is reversible only if a review of the 
record persuades us that without the error there was a 
reasonable likelihood of a more favorable result for the 
defendant. State v. Banner. 717 P.2d 1325, 1335 (Utah 1986), 
In Banner, the court held that reversible error had occurred 
where defendant's two prior convictions for assault with intent 
to commit rape were admitted into evidence. Banner was charged 
with committing sodomy on a child and sexual abuse of a child. 
As a result of the trial court's decision to admit evidence of 
the prior conviction, Banner decided not to testify. The Utah 
Supreme Court found that the trial court erred in failing to 
exclude the convictions because they were more prejudicial than 
probative under 609(a)(1). Further, the court found that the 
admission of the convictions was reversible error because 
"[a]fter review of the record [it was] not convinced that had 
defendant testified, the outcome in this case would necessarily 
have been the same." Id. 
In this case, witnesses at trial included the grocery store 
manager, the store's security officer and the arresting police 
officer. The manager testified that after Brown entered the 
store for the second time, he retrieved the cigarettes from the 
grocery cart where he had left them, walked quickly up the 
aisle past the checkout stands to an exit door, activated the 
door by stepping on the interior pad, and then stepped outside 
the store. During cross-examination, the manager continued to 
1. In Wight, we analyzed the facts under 609(a)(1) because the 
prior crime was punishable by imprisonment in excess of one 
year. !£. That section is not applicable in this case because 
the prior convictions are for misdemeanors. 
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assert that Brown had one foot outside the store when stopped 
by the security officer. Similarly, the security officer 
testified Brown was out of the store when apprehended. The 
manager did not recall if Brown had said something to the 
effect that he was not outside the store, while the security 
officer thought such a statement might have been made. The 
manager also testified he saw Brown put the cigarettes in the 
grocery cart, exit the store, and ride his bike past the store 
twice, while looking in the store window. We find that the 
evidence was overwhelming as to Brown's intent to steal the 
cigarettes and are not convinced that it is reasonably likely 
that Brown's testimony would have produced an acquittal. 
Therefore, the error in denying the motion in limine was 
harmless. 
Brown also claims the trial court erred by refusing to 
grant a new trial because a juror had allegedly lied during 
voir dire questioning and had made derogatory remarks about 
Brown prior to jury deliberations. In McDonouoh Power 
Equipment, Inc. v. Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548 (1984), the United 
States Supreme Court addressed the applicable test where a 
juror had allegedly failed to disclose information during voir 
dire questioning. The Court said, 
We hold that to obtain a new trial in such 
a situation, a party must first 
demonstrate that a juror failed to answer 
honestly a material question on voir dire, 
and then further show that a correct 
response would have provided a valid basis 
for a challenge for cause. 
464 U.S. at 556. In this case, the juror allegedly failed to 
disclose that he had had retail experience. However, Brown 
failed to prove that the juror actually had such experience and 
further failed to demonstrate that there would have been "a 
valid basis for challenge for cause." 
In regard to the allegedly prejudicial remarks made by one 
juror, the trial court met with the jury after receiving a note 
from the jury. The trial court then further instructed the 
jurors on their responsibilities. After the jury rendered its 
verdict, the trial court polled each juror and asked whether 
the verdict was influenced by anything other than properly 
presented evidence and the court's instructions on the law. 
Each juror responded appropriately. Further, after the motion 
for a new trial was filed, the trial court found that the 
alleged statements of one juror were "ambiguous and subject to 
multiple interpretation" and that they did not constitute a 
predetermination of guilt nor direct prejudice against Brown. 
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The trial court's decision on a motion for a new trial is 
largely within the court's discretion and will not be reversed 
on appeal unless there is a clear abuse of that discretion. 
State v. Williams, 712 P.2d 220, 222 (Utah 1985). We find no 
abuse of discretion in the trial court's refusal to grant a new 
trial because of improper juror actions. 
Affilmed. 
Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge 
I .CONCUR: 
Judith M. Billings, Judge 
I CONCUR IN THE RESULT: 
Russell W. Bench, Judge 
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ADDENDUM B 
STATK v. 
Ctle M MO f 26 
the officer's report was properly "sworn" 
in the present case Mcknight involved 
the validity of a sworn application filed 
with the Statt> Land Board The affiant 
signed the applications before a notary in 
blank Later, on February 2, 1962, while 
the affiant was in Denver, the applications 
were completed by affiants agent and 
presented to the notary, who notarized 
them as "Subscribed and sworn to before 
me this 2nd day of February. 1962 at Salt 
Lake City, Utah " The Court found that 
the affiant "did not subscribe and swear to 
said applications on said date, but he did 
confer with (the notary] by telephone at 
various times on said date" about the appli-
cations 14 Utah 2d at 241, 381 P.2d at 
72h 
Relying on the Spongier case, the adver-
sary contended that the oath was invalid 
and therefore the applications were invalid. 
In rejecting that contention, this Court spe-
cified the duties of the officer administer-
ing the oath: "(H]e is required to know and 
state [that] the person who took the oath 
did declare himself to be the person men-
tioned in the oath, and . . . he manifested 
an intention to be bound by it." 14 Utah 
2d at 249. 381 P.2d at 733 Next, the Court 
listed the essentials of an oath, as quoted 
by the majority in this case Immediately 
thereafter, the Court added this caution: 
"The administration fof the oath] need 
not follow any $et pattern. The ritual is 
of secondary importance and does not 
affect the validity of the oath" Id, 881 
P.2d at 734 (emphasis added). 
The administration of the oath in the 
instant case met all of the requirements 
defined in the Mc Knight case. If the oath 
was proper on the facts of that case—as 
this Court held—then the sworn statement 
in this case is valid also. 
To turn back the clock to the literal lan-
guage in Spongier—as the majority does-
exalts a technicality beyond all reasonable 
limits and establishes a principle that will 
haunt the administration of every criminal 
and civil proceeding that relies on oaths or 
sworn statements. Such a holding is un-
necessary because subsequent opinions in 
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Mathews and Mcknight have erased that 
technicality. It is unwise because it serves 
no useful purpose. 1 would rely on our 
most recent cases and affirm the judgment 
of the district court. 
STEWART, J., concurs in the dissenting 
opinion of OAKS, J 
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Defendant was convicted in the Third 
District Court, Salt Lake County, James S. 
Sawaya. J., of burglary and robbery, and 
he appealed. The Supreme Court held 
that: (1) an alleged accomplice's attorney's 
suggestion that defendant's alibi witness 
might have been the accomplice was within 
the permissible area m which counsel legiti-
mately could analyze and comment in his 
argument to the jury; (2) the evidence sus-
tained the conviction; and (3) there was no 
error in requiring the defendant to answer 
question as to a prior misdemeanor convic-
tion involving theft. 
Judgments and verdicts affirmed. 
Oaks, J., concurred in the result. 
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Alleged accomplice's attorney's sug-
gestion that defendant's alibi witness may 
have been the accomplice was within the 
permissible area in which counsel legiti-
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mately could analyse and comment in his 
argument to the jury. 
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Evidence was sufficient to sustain con-
victions for burglary and robbery'. U.C.A, 
19S3, 7S-6-203, 76-6-302 
Joseph C. Fratto, Jr., Salt Lake City, for 
defendant and appellant. 
David L Wilkinson, Atty Gen , Salt Lake 
City, for plaintiff and respondent. 
PER CURIAM 
On appeal from jury verdicts of burglary 
and robbery.1 defendant urges 1) miscon-
duct of his accomplice's counsel in suggest-
ing that defendant's "alibi" witness may 
have been the accomplice, 2) insufficiency 
of the evidence, and 3) error in requiring 
answer as to a previous misdemeanor con-
viction 
(1 ] Defendant was tried with an alleged 
accomplice, one Joe Price In argument, 
Prices attorney suggested that defend-
ant's alibi witness may have been the ac-
complice This is well within the permissi-
ble area in which counsel legitimately can 
analyze and comment in his argument to a 
jury.1 
(2] As to the second issue put on ap-
peal, it., insufficiency of the evidence, the 
following properly admitted evidence was 
adduced at trial. At 8.-00 am on July 26, 
1982, the victim was awakened and turned 
on the kitchen lights, went to the back 
door, and looked out on the well-lit porch. 
There he saw a "Spanish-looking" young 
man, who had come to the house three 
times before, once to obtain gas for his car 
and twice just "to talk." The victim would 
not let the young man in the house. A 
second, blond man kicked the door open, 
knocking the victim down, and then jumped 
on his back and head. The victim also 
received a severe cut from a knife carried 
by his assailant The victim heard the man 
1. In violation of U CJL. 1953, H 76-t-20l and 
76-6-302. 
aay "Rick." which could have been a rtfer 
tnce to the defendant, whose first name 
was Richard. 
After the police were notified, they ap-
prehended defendant from the description 
given The victim's brother-in-law also 
identified the defendant as one who Canu-
te his home for gas the same day the latter 
sought gas from the victim, a few houses 
away. On the day of arrest, the defendant 
quickly was identified as the burglar in a 
lineup. No objection is made to the compo-
sition of the lineup. The jury did not re-
spond favorably to the defendant's alibi 
evidence and he was convicted. 
The other point raised on appeal, i.e.. 
error in requiring the defendant to answer 
as to conviction of a prior "misdemeanor," 
was based on the interdiction in Rule 21. 
Utah Rules of Evidence. That rule pro-
vides as follows: 
Evidence of the conviction of a witness 
for a crime not involving dishonesty or 
false statement shall be inadmissible for 
the purpose of impairing his credibility, 
except as otherwise provided by statute 
The misdemeanor to which the defendant 
had to answer was a conviction in a justice 
of the peace court for theft. The only 
"otherwise" statute adverted to in the Rule 
is that requiring answer to a prior commis-
sion of felony. Therefore, the only convic-
tion for misdemeanor that would be admis-
sible to test credibility would be one "in-
volving dishonesty or false statement." 
The prosecution correctly contends that im-
pliedly theft is admissible since it obviously 
involves "dishonesty." There was no error 
in requiring the defendant to answer the 
question. 
The judgments and verdicts are af-
firmed. 
OAKS, J., concurs in the result 
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